


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WHEN AND WHY THE BOERS ARMED.

(Reprinted from the "Morning Leader" of
30 December, 1899.)

For the benefit of the man in the street, those who made this war have invented the myth of a vast Dutch conspiracy against the British Empire. They dare not admit that we were the aggressors. So the war is described as "inevitable," the result of a plot to overthrow the empire which has been maturing in President Kruger's brain ever since Mr. Gladstone's so-called "surrender" after Majuba. For evidence of all this we are referred to the Boer armaments. In words that have found an echo in the speeches of Lord Salisbury and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the *Daily Mail* has assured us that

the Boers have for nearly eighteen years been accumulating artillery, rifles, melinite, German and Hollander officers, with which to oust England from South Africa.

If this can be proved, then we allow that there is a solid basis for the theory of a Dutch conspiracy, we will admit that the Boers have provoked the war and are morally the aggressors.

**

The burden of proof lies with the Yellow Press. So far, if we except Mr. Hugh Price Hughes's vague reference to the testimony of unnamed "Christian missionaries and laymen," it has produced not a single item of positive evidence. We are left to the testimony of the Blue-books and the correspondents of the *Times*. The earliest reference to the subject that we can find is in an article on "Natal and the Transvaal in 1890," published by the *Times* on 7 November last. The writer states that he visited the barracks, arsenal, &c., in Pretoria. The "standing army," he tells us, was limited to a "single battery" of obsolete guns, and he adds "*the military inefficiency in every detail was in 1889 beneath contempt.*" Six years later Major Robert White was sent to Pretoria at the cost of the Chartered Company to spy out the land. He, too, visited the Pretoria arsenal, and his investigations were assisted by Colonel Frank Rhodes and Captain Ernest Rhodes. Nine months later the diary in which he recorded his impressions was picked up on the field of Krugersdorp. It contains a quaint inventory of the guns which he found in Pretoria:—

1. Half-a-dozen very old pieces of ordnance, mortars, etc.
2. One bronze gun of the date of the Second Empire
3. A broken Maxim-Nordenfelt.
4. A small muzzle-loader in bad condition.

Besides these broken and obsolete weapons there were at most nine other light guns and three Maxims. The list concludes with the remark—

None of the guns I saw were fit for much work.

Clearly then the best evidence which the spies of the Chartered Company with all Mr. Rhodes' millions behind them could find went to show that, so far as artillery was concerned, the Boers were, on the eve of the Raid, almost absolutely unprovided.

**

But it may be argued that Major White was hoodwinked. He may not have seen the modern armaments at Pretoria. That is possible, but we have other evidence to show that when they actually did begin to arm, the Boers were by no means reluctant to reveal their resources. From Captain Young-husband, who visited Pretoria for the *Times* early in 1896, they did not conceal the fact that

Orders for batteries of field guns, quick-firing guns, and Maxims, and for sufficient rifles to arm every Dutchman in South Africa were being sent to Europe; European drill instructors and artillerymen were being imported, and forts were being constructed round Pretoria on the most approved designs. One attempt had been made to take their country from them; they were thoroughly convinced that the attempt would be renewed at some future date; so the Boers were determined to be thoroughly on their guard the second time.

Yet he entirely corroborates Major White's estimate of the Boer armaments before the Raid, when he writes:

The Boers had very nearly been caught napping at the beginning of the year.

**

But there is other evidence still. The *Daily News* has appealed to the famous Uitlander manifesto and to the Transvaal budgets. The manifesto is dated 27 December, 1895. It was written when the Johannesburg conspiracy was no longer a secret. That manifesto informs us that £250,000 "is to be spent upon the completing of a fort at Pretoria," &c., and that orders have been placed in Germany for heavy guns and ammunition. Note the future tense. The document shows that at the end of 1895, on the admission of the Uitlanders themselves, the Boers were inadequately armed and had suddenly begun to set to work to remedy their deficiencies. The Transvaal Budget tells the same tale. For 1892 the military expenditure of the Republic was only some £29,739, in 1893 it was £19,340, in 1894 £28,158. In 1895, the year of the Raid, it rises to £87,308, and leaps in 1896 to a round half-million. It has been suggested that payments for armaments lurk under the headings "Public Works," "Special Payments," "Sundry Services," but the totals for these items tell the same tale. In 1894 they figure out to £528,526, in 1895 they rise to £1,485,244, while in 1896 they stand at £2,007,372. The trail of the Raid is over all these statistics.

**

But we are not left to conjecture. We happen to know exactly at what stage Mr. Kruger took alarm, exactly which of the preparations that led to the Raid persuaded him to reorganise his army and send to Europe for his guns and his instructors. In the *St. James's Gazette* of 29 August last there appeared over the signature "Anglo-Africander," a remarkable account of a consultation

which the writer, who was then in the service of a foreign power, had with Mr. Kruger and General Joubert in September, 1895. Mr. Kruger asked him why the Chartered Company was buying "hundreds of horses" for presentation to the new Volunteer Rhodesian Horse. Mr. Kruger would see in this only one meaning, which he summed up in the saying, "*Rhodes is going to jump my country*," and Gen. Joubert also came to the conclusion that "*it is time to shut our doors, as robbers are about*." Here, then, at last is the whole story of the Boer armaments. They were Mr. Kruger's answer to Mr. Rhodes' Raid. They were undertaken not for aggression but for defence, they were continued because the Boers knew right well that the men who had conspired against their independence in 1895 would renew the attack before the party see-saw had removed from the Colonial Office their ally and accomplice—Mr. Joseph Chamberlain.

**

The Boers, then, armed only after the Jameson Raid had warned them that their independence was threatened. That fact in itself all but demolishes the myth of a Dutch conspiracy to oust us from South Africa. It proves at all events that up to 1896 such an ambition was not a practical factor in Transvaal politics. But it may be said that with the resentment that followed Mr. Rhodes' freebooting expedition there came also the determination to erect South Africa into an independent Boer State. To a certain extent this is plausible. There was throughout South Africa a closing of the ranks against British "Imperialism" as represented by Mr. Rhodes and the De Beers group of alien financiers. But all this involved absolutely no thought of disloyalty to the British Crown. Of this one needs no more convincing proof than an article which appeared in the *Times* on 16 May, 1899. It was written presumably by Miss Flora Shaw, who acted as Mr. Rhodes' accredited agent in London at the time of the Raid. None will dispute her authority on South African affairs, or deny her party bias against the Boers. Yet she pens a striking defence of the loyalty of the Cape Dutch, quoting, for example, Mr. Hofmeyr's recent declaration that "if he could do anything to make the English flag wave in South Africa yet many and many a year, he would do it." She has misgivings only regarding some of the Republican Dutch, whose ideal, she tells us, is *an Afrikander Confederation, independent of Downing-st., yet under the British flag and within a Federated Empire*. This, after all, is the ideal that has long been realised in Canada, and will shortly be accomplished in Australia. It is not inconsistent with fervent loyalty.

**

The conclusion then which remains is that the Boers armed only for defence after the monstrous invasion of 1895. They dreaded its repetition, and with reason. Its real authors went unpunished. Mr. Chamberlain still sat in Downing-street, and publicly whitewashed Mr. Rhodes' honour in the House, while the raiders became the heroes of the Empire. And we now know what reason they had to arm and to anticipate a fresh invasion. If Reuter's correspondent can be trusted, the Boers found at Dundee among General Symons' papers conclusive proofs that in 1896 and 1897 immediately after the Raid the British Government set to work devising plans for the invasion not only of the Transvaal, but also of the Orange Free State. These papers include "portfolios of military sketches of various routes of invasion into the Transvaal and Free State, prepared . . . immediately after the Jameson Raid," and also "Reconnaissance Reports of Lines of Advance through the Free State," prepared in 1897. The Boers had after all some excuse for defensive

preparations. After this disclosure it would be a graceful if ineffectual act of reparation to desist from further talk about Boer aggression and Dutch designs to drive us into the sea.

SIR ALFRED MILNER AND THE "DUTCH CONSPIRACY."

The following despatch was sent to Mr. Chamberlain by Sir Alfred Milner, in August, 1897, or about eighteen months after the Raid :—

Government House, Cape Town, August 23, 1897.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that the proceedings in connexion with her Majesty's Jubilee have passed off in the most successful manner, both at Cape Town and, as far as I am able to judge, throughout South Africa. . . . I have no doubt the same loyalty has been displayed in other parts of the Empire; but it appears to me to be of peculiar interest under the special circumstances of this Colony, and in view of recent events, which, as you are aware, have caused a feeling of considerable bitterness among different sections of the community. All that I can say is that, as far as I am able to judge, these racial differences have not affected the loyalty of any portion of the population to her Majesty the Queen. People of all races—the English, the Dutch, the Asiatics, as well as the African natives—have vied with one another in demonstrations of affection for her person and devotion to the Throne. . . . It is impossible to doubt that the feeling of loyalty among all sections of the population is much stronger than has sometimes been believed.—I have, &c.,

A. MILNER,
Governor and High Commissioner.

FACTS THAT SPEAK FOR DUTCH LOYALTY.

- (1) In 1895, *before the Raid*, not only the Cape Dutch but the Orange Free State, believing the Transvaal in the wrong over the Drifts Question were prepared to support us, if necessary, with money and arms.
- (2) In 1898 the present Dutch Ministry voted an annual contribution of £30,000 to the Imperial Navy.
- (3) It also made over to the Imperial Authorities the splendid naval station of Simon's Bay.

Of this Mr. Goschen said so lately as 18 May, 1899 :—

"The motion to grant £30,000 a year was passed unanimously. The Afrikanders were in power. The power had passed from Sir Gordon Sprigg; the Schreiner, the Bond party were at the helm. But it made no difference, and let the country understand it,"—and he called upon other Colonies to imitate "the patriotic example."

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THE CASE OF THE NATIVES.

*(Reprinted from the "Morning Leader" of
6 January, 1900.)*

Mr. Rhodes once complained with exceeding bitterness that "they think more of one native at home than of the whole of South Africa." In those days the Churches were ranged against him. But the times have changed, and Mr. Hugh Price Hughes comes forward to plead in one breath for Mr. Rhodes and the "niggers" who were once such a thorn in his side. The *Methodist Times* has discovered yet another pretext for destroying the independence of the Transvaal.

Some apologists hold that we are waging war to rescue the "helots" of Johannesburg from intolerable oppression, while Mr. Hays Hammond of the Consolidated Goldfields, has told us that it is to dower them with two millions and a quarter in increased dividends. Some will have it that we are but repelling Boer aggression, while others think that our armies are now busied in asserting British prestige and Paramountcy. Mr. Hughes has an entirely novel theory. He assures us that "England is now fighting against the slavery of the African race as truly as the Northern States fought against it in the Civil War." Whether we know it or not, we are avenging the wrongs of the Kaffirs whom the Dutch have so long oppressed—for Mr. Hughes can hardly suppose that actual slavery prevails in the Transvaal. It is a comfortable theory, though we doubt whether it would justify the diplomatic provocations and the campaign of lies that brought the war about. But is it true? Will the natives be the gainers when the Union Jack floats over the Rand?

**

Before we consider the case of the Transvaal it may be well to take a summary glance at the present position of things in our own colonies and possessions:—

1. In the strip of East African coast—a British Protectorate—which faces Zanzibar, the full "legal status of slavery" is maintained, and fugitive slaves have even been handed back to their owners by British officials.

2. In Zanzibar and Pemba the manumission of slaves, presided over by Sir Arthur Hardinge, is proceeding slowly, and many thousands are still in bondage.
3. In Natal the corvée system prevails, and all natives not employed by whites may be impressed to labor for six months of the year on the roads.
4. In Bechuanaland, after a recent minor rebellion, natives were parcelled out among the Cape farmers and indentured to them as virtual slaves for a term of years.
5. Under the Chartered Company in Rhodesia the chiefs are required, under compulsion, to furnish batches of young natives to work in the mines, and the ingenious plan of taxing the Kaffir in money rather than in kind has been adopted so that he may be forced to earn the pittance which the prospectors are willing to pay him.
6. In Kimberley what is known as the "compound" system prevails. All natives who work in the diamond fields are required to "reside" under lock and key, day and night, in certain compounds, which resemble spacious prisons. So stringent is the system that even the sick are treated only within the prison yard. On no pretext whatever is a native allowed to leave his compound.

After all, the hands of the Northern States were a little cleaner than our own when they championed the cause of the slave.

It would be easy to make an *ex parte* defence of the Dutch, but we prefer instead to accept the deliberate judgment of the only impartial writer on South Africa known to us—Mr. Bryce. He tells us that the laws of the Boer Republics are indeed harsher than those of the English colonies—though of course they in no way sanction slavery—but, on the other hand, "one often hears that the Dutch get on better with their black servants than the English do." The attitude of *both* races to the blacks he describes as "contemptuous, unfriendly, and even suspicious," and elsewhere he speaks of the "deep and widespread aversion to the colored people." The only "atrocity" which he mentions, though he gives it as an exceptional case, was the work of Englishmen,

A white farmer—an Englishman, not a Boer—flogged his Kaffir servant so severely that the latter died; and when the culprit was put on his trial and acquitted by a white jury, his white neighbours escorted him home with a band of music.

We hear much of the Boer practice of flogging natives with sjamboks. Mr. Bryce tells us that in Rhodesia it is proposed to compel the natives to work in the mines by means of the lash, "demands," which he well says, "seem fitter for the mouths of Spaniards in the sixteenth century than for Englishmen in the nineteenth." But there are three broad facts which seem to show that the Boers do not on the whole very grievously oppress the natives:

1. The black population of the Transvaal has increased under their rule from about 20,000 to nearly 700,000.
2. That they respect the honor of the native women is proved by the fact that no race of half-breeds is found in their territories.

3. The blacks have not, as we were told they would, taken advantage of this war to wreak vengeance on their oppressors.

On the whole question we cannot, perhaps, do better than say with Mr. Bryce that our countrymen "have done so many things to be deplored, that it does not lie with them to cast stones at the Boers. . . . Only two sets of Europeans are free from reproach, the imperial officials—and the clergy." If there has been anything to choose between the attitude of Boers and Englishmen towards the Kaffirs, the rather more humane behavior of our countrymen is due, as Mr. Bryce has told us, to the fact that in days when England was still proud that she had led the way in the abolition of slavery humanitarian feeling at home did for a time exercise a fairly effective control over our own colonists. But the party which Sir Arthur Hardinge, our pro-Consul in Zanzibar, once described in a Blue-book as "the anti-slavery faction," is not so strong to-day as it was when Bright and Gladstone still lived.

We agree, therefore, with Mr. Hughes in deplored the Boer treatment of the native for the same reason that we condemn the behaviour of our own colonists. But to his contention that the blacks will gain by the substitution of British for Boer rule there is a clearer answer.

The Rand financiers have told us very plainly what they mean to do when, as the price of gallant lives and broken hearts, they rule as absolutely in Johannesburg as they do in Kimberley. At a meeting of the Consolidated Goldfields Company of South Africa held in the City on 14 Nov., the consulting engineer boldly announced that under English rule he hoped to be able to cut down the wages of the Kaffirs by one half, and a director who followed him declared that they would *compel* the natives to work for them. Here are some passages from their speeches :—

Mr. Hays Hammond was tolerably frank :

"There are," said Mr. Hammond, "in South Africa millions of Kaffirs, and it does seem preposterous that we are not able to obtain 70,000 or 80,000 Kaffirs to work upon the mines. . . . With good government there should be an abundance of labor, and with an abundance of labor there will be no difficulty in cutting down wages, because it is preposterous to pay a Kaffir the present wages. He would be quite as well satisfied—in fact, he would work longer—if you gave him half the amount. (Laughter.) His wages are altogether disproportionate to his requirements. (Renewed laughter.)

Put the voice of the philanthropist spoke even more clearly through Mr. Rudd :—

If they could only get one-half the natives to work three months of the year it would work wonders. He was not pleading for the mines, or urging the views of capitalists, but from the point of view of progress, agriculture, public works, mines, and the general prosperity of the country. *They should try some cogent form of inducement or practically compel the native*, through taxation or in some other way, to contribute his quota to the good of the community, and to a certain extent he would then have to work. He was not advocating slavery. As in everything else, there were the use

and abuse of labor, and there was constantly the deliberate misuse of the word slavery by those who wanted to raise it as a bogey. If under the cry of civilisation we in Egypt lately mowed down 10,000 or 20,000 Dervishes with Maxims surely it cannot be considered a hardship to compel the natives in South Africa to give three months in the year to do a little honest work. We have in power to-day a strong Government, but there is a morbid sentimentality among a large section of the community on the question of the natives, and Government require the support of the majority of their countrymen. Mr. Rhodes started what was known as the Glen Gray Act, tending to the regulation of native labour. He knew that Sir Alfred Milner, whom they all trusted so well, had travelled throughout the country, and was therefore able now to form a pretty good opinion with regard to the natives, and he considered that if Mr. Rhodes and Sir Alfred Milner would put their heads together the effect would be that they would be able to propose something practical in this direction which would make for the general welfare and prosperity of the country.

As a study in complicated cant this would be difficult to beat. In St. James's Hall Mr. Hughes preaches a crusade against slavery. In the City Mr. Rudd chuckles at the prospect of forced native labour won by the statesmanship of Mr. Rhodes and Sir Alfred Milner. Yet Mr. Rudd and Mr. Hughes are both defending the same war.

WHAT MR. FROUDE SAID OF THE DUTCH TREATMENT OF NATIVES.

"If we compare the success of the Dutch in the management of uncivilised tribes with our own, in all parts of the world, it will be found that although their rule is stricter than ours and to appearance harsher, they have had fewer native wars than we have had. There has been less violence and bloodshed, and the natives living under them have not been less happy or less industrious."—*Oceana*, p. 37.

LIST OF "MORNING LEADER" LEAFLETS.

1. When and Why the Boers Armed.
2. The Case of the Natives.
3. Pushful Diplomacy.
4. The Uitlander Grievances.
5. The Real Motive for the War.
6. Mr. Chamberlain and the Raid.

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PUSHFUL DIPLOMACY.

(Reprinted from the "Morning Leader" of
9 January, 1900.)

There is no more puzzling or tedious chapter in modern history than the story of the negotiations that led us into this war. It is puzzling and it is tedious, however, merely because we are ignorant of the subterranean currents, the hidden influences, which really dictated our action. We were apathetic and indifferent just when the case of the Uitlanders seemed utterly hopeless, we grew violent and bellicose just when Mr. Kruger had yielded a little more than all our demands.

It is only nine months since the "crisis" opened with a debate in the House on the Colonial Office vote. It is hardly credible that on 20 March, 1899, the only champion of the Uitlanders was Sir Ellis Ashmead Bartlett. But most incredible of all, Mr. Chamberlain merely chaffed him, and the House roared with laughter when the Colonial Secretary inquired if Sir Ellis "expects us to go to war with the Transvaal." Yet all the facts known to-day were touched on then. The Edgar murder, which in Sir Alfred Milner's opinion was the kernel of the whole Uitlander case, had just formed the subject of a question. The dynamite monopoly, the demand for the franchise, the general misgovernment and unrest—all these things Mr. Chamberlain dealt with trenchantly and fully, and yet his conclusion was that interference would be neither "dignified" nor "expedient," and as the end of the whole matter he announced that he "did not intend to take any very strong action."

Next morning the Press, which since then has clamored most violently for war, was absolutely satisfied. The hard case of the Uitlander stirred no chord in its heart. It cared little for the Edgar affair, ignored the petition to the Queen which already had been signed, and even the dynamite monopoly failed to rouse its indignation. Here is the *Times*' view of the case on 21 March, 1899:—

Interference is inadvisable. . . . Such a policy would not carry public opinion in this country with it. . . . The Boers must be allowed still to go their own way. Time is not on their side.

The "Little Englander," the "paid agents of the Boers," the "peace-at-any-price party" have, after all, done nothing worse than to repeat in October the views of Mr. Chamberlain and the *Times* in March.

**

But, you will say, the situation changed in the interval. It did indeed change. Mr. Chamberlain judged it hopeless at the end of March. By August it had so far improved that Mr. Kruger had first of all consented to discuss the question at Bloemfontein—a great step—had then introduced his complicated seven years' franchise, and finally had offered slightly more than the Milner minimum. Sir Alfred Milner had chosen to set all other demands aside and concentrate on the five years' franchise. Why, then, when

this was granted, did we still drift towards war? The matter deserves a detailed study.

Here were Mr. Kruger's proposals of 22 August :—

1. A five year's retrospective franchise.
2. Eight new seats for the Uitlanders, giving them 10 representatives in a chamber of 36.
3. Equal rights for old and new burghers in the election of the President and the Commandant General.
4. As to details, friendly suggestions would be welcomed.

In return for these concessions he made the following conditions :—

- (a) That the present intervention shall not constitute a precedent for future interference in the internal affairs of the Republic.
- (b) That controversy regarding the suzerainty is to be tacitly dropped.
- (c) Arbitration, from which foreigners are to be excluded to be recognised.

And, finally, Mr. Kruger undertook to pass his new law within a few weeks, and begged for a speedy settlement of the whole question in order to avoid a disastrous racial war.

**

Why, then, did not Mr. Chamberlain at once close with these terms? With the *proposals* themselves he could not quarrel; but were the *conditions* unacceptable? Fresh from the Peace Conference we could not refuse to consider arbitration, especially as foreigners were to be excluded from the proposed tribunal. The condition of "non-interference," moreover, is nothing more nor less than a re-statement of the principle of the Conventions. Again and again her Majesty's Ministers—Mr. Chamberlain among them—have explained that in granting to the Transvaal "complete self-government" we resigned the right to meddle in its internal affairs. There remains then only the vexed question of our "suzerainty."

**

Here in brief are the facts about our suzerainty. We laid claim to it in the Convention of 1881, which granted to the Transvaal a qualified independence. The Boers, however, were dissatisfied with their position; and in 1884 a new convention was signed, which dropped all mention of our claim. As Lord Salisbury has put it, we *bargained away* the suzerainty. On 17 October he said in the House of Lords, "in order to get that hateful word out of his Convention, he (Mr. Kruger) made considerable territorial and other sacrifices." In other words Mr. Kruger bought his freedom with a price in 1884. For twelve years he kept it unchallenged. As recently as 31 December, 1895, Mr. Chamberlain himself, in a dispatch to the Chartered Company, referred to the Transvaal as "*a foreign State* with which her Majesty is at peace and in treaty relations." It was not till 1897 that Mr. Chamberlain, seeking for a pretext for war, thought of repudiating a national bargain which Lord Salisbury himself cannot deny. In 1897 our pushful Colonial Secretary revived our claim to the suzerainty once more, on the ground that, though the Convention of 1881 was abrogated, yet its preamble still remains in force. It is a subtle point, but for once common-sense and the lawyers are agreed. Here is what Sir Edward Clarke, who was Solicitor-General in the late Tory Administration, said on this matter :—

For any British Minister, since 1884, to assert that this country had a suzerainty over the Transvaal, was not only a statement made in defiance of fact, but also a breach of national faith (19 October, *House of Commons*).

Yet it is this monstrous, this dishonest, claim that our armies are now maintaining to-day.

**

Mr. Kruger might very well have asked us to give something in return for the liberal franchise law which he was ready to propose. But as a matter of

fact he asked for nothing new. He asked only that we should loyally observe the spirit of the Convention of 1884, in which we resigned our suzerainty and our right to interfere in the Transvaal's internal affairs. Had the Colonial Secretary intended to avert war he could not have hesitated to accept these terms; and, indeed, he does not dare to admit that he refused them. In the debate of 19 October he declared that he considered these proposals "extremely promising," and that his answer to them was "most conciliatory"—was, indeed, intended as an acceptance. That answer was given in two forms. There was first a very plain speech at Highbury on 26 August, and there was also a very ambiguous dispatch dated 28 August, so ambiguous indeed that Mr. Kruger may be excused if he used the telegraphic summary of the Highbury speech to interpret it. In that speech he complained that Mr. Kruger "procrastinates in his replies," "dribbles out reforms like water from a squeezed sponge," and "accompanies his offers with conditions which he knows to be impossible." He went on to blame him for not accepting Sir A. Milner's "compromise," announced that "the sands were running down in the glass," and concluded by threatening that if Mr. Kruger did not yield very quickly, we should not be content "with what we have already offered." And yet Mr. Kruger had just made "extremely promising proposals," strictly on the lines of the Milner Compromise.

Turning to the dispatch, three things at least are clear. (1) Mr. Chamberlain, after complaining of Mr. Kruger's delays, himself "procrastinates." He gives no clear answer, but he asks Mr. Kruger to wait for some fresh proposals, to submit to a further inquiry, and to come to Cape Town for a conference. One cannot help concluding that the despatch of troops to South Africa had something to do with Mr. Chamberlain's novel desire to gain time. (2) He definitely rejects any compromise on the suzerainty question, knowing full well, as Lord Salisbury put it in the House of Lords, on 17 October, that "the desire to get rid of the word 'suzerainty,' and the reality which it expresses, has been the dream of Mr. Kruger's life." (3) Perceiving that Mr. Kruger will yield on the franchise question, he at once shifts his ground and raises his terms.

Sir A. Milner had explicitly made the Franchise the sole issue between ourselves and the Transvaal, the other matters were to be dropped, and the Uitlanders, converted into burghers, were to be left to work out their own salvation. No sooner does Mr. Kruger give way, however, than "the policy of the Sibylline books" comes into play. The Uitlanders, who at first had accepted the Milner minimum, believing that Mr. Kruger would never grant it, were now clamoring for more. On 25 August the Uitlander Council and the South African League informed the Government that even a five years' franchise was inadequate, and at the same time they drew up a list of the further concessions which *would* satisfy them:—

1. Equal language rights.
2. Disarmament of the Boer population and demolition of the forts.
3. Right of public meeting with freedom of speech and of the Press.
4. Abolition of industrial monopolies.
5. Removal of religious disabilities.
6. Provision for independence of the High Court.
7. Right to vote for election of President and Commandant-General.
8. Local government, with power to appoint local officials and control the police.

This dishonest policy was openly urged on Mr. Chamberlain from London. It meant only that the Transvaal must be forced into war at all costs. Thus on 9 August the *Daily Mail* declared, "If the Transvaal cannot agree to the British terms, these terms must be raised, not lowered." Solicited from

Johannesburg and London alike, Mr. Chamberlain fell without a struggle. His dispatch concluded with the reminder that

there are other matters of difference between the two Governments which will not be settled by the grant of political representation to the Uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to arbitration.

That meant to the Boer mind that there was no finality in British demands. Looking not only to Mr. Chamberlain's record at the time of the Raid, but to his present speeches and dispatches, they could only come to the conclusion that he meant once more to strike at their independence and force a war upon them.

Consider how the whole course of the negotiations must have struck the Boers:—

1. In *March* the position of the Uitlanders seemed hopeless. Yet Mr. Chamberlain ridicules the idea of war, and is content to leave everything to time.
2. In *June* we demand a five years' franchise, which we declare will amply satisfy us.
3. In *August* Mr. Kruger grants this five years' franchise.
4. We thereupon immediately raise our terms, make fresh demands, and redouble our military preparations.

What other conclusion can be drawn from this than that Mr. Chamberlain was bent on war? Our ultimatum, it is true, was never issued. An army corps was sent instead. The only possible inference is that our demands vastly exceeded the Milner minimum which Mr. Kruger had been willing to concede, and that they were such as the Transvaal could not honorably grant. If we may accept the inspired summary of them in the *Daily Telegraph* of 9 October, they included, together with a number of administrative reforms, the disarmament of the Boer population and the demolition of the forts.

But more than this, we gave deliberate provocation. The moment our final demands were framed at the end of September, a forward movement took place in Natal. For it was at this moment that the disastrous decision was taken to occupy Dundee. This it was, as the *Times* itself has confessed (in a letter from Ladysmith, published 18 November), that precipitated a conflict.

We did not drift, we did not even stumble, into war. We were pushed into it with very considerable skill.

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THE UITLANDER GRIEVANCES.

(Reprinted from the "Morning Leader" of
10 January, 1900.)

"THIS LAND OF LIES." Winston Churchill.

More than anything else it was the impression that fellow countrymen of our own have been the victims of "Boer brutality" and "police terrorism" that created a sentiment favorable to war. The "helots" on the Rand, we were told by the *St. James's Gazette*, "have been robbed, assaulted, murdered at the sweet will of Mr. Kruger's janissaries." "Every Boer," said the *Daily Mail*, "believes that the Englishman is a creature who can be spat upon," and of the whole crisis no less an authority than Sir A. Milner has said that it "arose out of the Edgar incident." The demand for the franchise would not have brought war with it. Mr. Kruger, as we have shown in a previous article, conceded what we had asked. Moreover, it was too notorious that the Uitlanders, in the words of Mr. Lionel Phillips, did not "care a fig" about the franchise. If we are at war to-day it is because the English public was convinced that the lot of the Uitlander in some way resembled that of the Armenian.

The most singular feature of this agitation is its novelty. Compare the Uitlanders' Petition of 1899 with the Pre-Raid Manifesto of 27 Dec., 1895, and you will find that while both documents complain of the same economic grievances and the same political wrongs, the former deals at great length with the whole subject of the misconduct of the police, a point regarding which the earlier appeal is wholly silent. Now why did the Uitlanders complain in 1895 of the dynamite monopoly, the educational grievances, the refusal of the franchise, etc., and yet omit all reference to the outrages which have brought at last the war for which they clamored? It was not from reticence, it was not from a desire for moderation. Have the Boers, then, in the interval, grown more brutal, more violent, or have the Uitlanders learned at last the secret of successful agitation? An ingenuous leading article in the *Times of Natal* has answered our question for us:—

Franchise, paramountcy, and so forth, have been all very useful in the evolutionary process of education. But before we shall have finished we have to reach that point when home opinion shall have come into line with opinion in Natal as to the necessity for a clean sweep of the present order of things in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and of the Bond in Cape Colony. To do this there is but little cause now to harp upon old well-worn grievances. Those have already become fairly well understood at home. The best object lessons we can now employ are those atrocities to our women and children. If we are to disarm those who are now against us at home, and who will endeavour in the day of our triumph

to restore as much of the Boer power as possible, out of a misplaced sentiment for a weak foe, and who could go frantic over atrocities in Bulgaria, then, if they require atrocities to assist their comprehension of facts, and to disarm their opposition, so be it. It should not now be difficult to supply the necessary chapter of horrors to strike the imagination even of these good people.

In other words, the failure "to supply the necessary chapter of horrors" was an unfortunate omission in the campaign of 1895. It has now been remedied, and our dull "imagination" has been stirred by "atrocities"—we have been "assisted" to understand the facts by a sort of vigorous symbolism—much as a child is taught its alphabet by pictures. Thanks to this lucky improvement in the method of illustrating and adorning the truth, we are now at wa—.

For the most part the talk about outrages has been somewhat vague. Thus the *Daily Mail* assured us on 11th October that "the Englishman is fighting . . . to protect his women from insult." We have searched in vain through the *Mail* file for any concrete case of outrage against women. What we do find are stories of hired villains who were "instructed" by the Boers "to strip Englishwomen naked," but for some reason not stated did nothing of the kind. Two genuine cases of murder have occurred. It is really rather striking that in a new country, among a mining population, throughout a long period of unrest and agitation, there have been no more than two. But let us take them in detail. The Edgar incident is the more important.

It began with a drunken quarrel between two Uitlanders, Edgar and Forster. Edgar struck Forster, knocking him senseless, and thereupon a third Uitlander named Sheppard called for the police, who on their arrival found Forster still senseless, whilst Edgar had got into his house and locked the door. The police were informed that Edgar had armed himself, and were discussing the question whether they should then force an entry into his house, when the assembled Uitlanders urged them to make the arrest at once, and they determined to do so. The door was easily forced, and the policeman in front, whose name was Jones, was met by Edgar, who struck at him twice with a formidable life preserver constructed of tough wood, with an iron nut screwed on one end and a loop at the other for the wrist. Either blow would have killed the policeman if it had reached its mark. Thereupon Jones drew his revolver and fired at Edgar, intending, as he said, to disable him only, but the bullet entered the heart and killed him. Forster died from the injuries inflicted by Edgar. Jones was put upon his trial and acquitted on the ground that he acted in self-defence. Jones, by the way, was the son of a Welsh father and a Dutch mother.

This incident is admittedly the kernel of the whole case against the Boers. The villain of the piece was not himself a Boer, he acted in self-defence, and at the worst was only a trifle hasty in anticipating the work of the public hangman. Yet the Welshman Jones is to-day the type of the brutal Boer and the murderer Edgar the personification of the oppressed Uitlander.

The second murder that is cited as a proof that "the lives of British subjects are insecure in the Transvaal," is the distressing Applebe case. Mrs. Applebe was murdered under circumstances of great brutality, but her assailants have never been discovered, and the chances are that they were not Boers, or even Uitlanders, but natives. It is the failure to find them that is made a charge against the Boers. With much greater reason one might argue that "the lives of British subjects" were "insecure" in Whitechapel some few years ago.

It seems needless to labour the question further. Had the Boer police been systematically brutal, would we find to-day that thousands of non-British-

Uitlanders were fighting for the Transvaal and not a man of them for England ? So strong is this argument that the *Daily Mail* was obliged to anticipate it with a lie. Thus on 29 June it said that "practically the whole of the non-English Uitlanders who are not on Mr. Kruger's pay lists are with Sir Alfred Milner"; and again on 31 Aug., "The Scandinavians have rejected a proposal to form a volunteer corps." Some scores of them fell gallantly in the cause of their oppressors at Magersfontein. To dispose finally of the legend of Mr. Kruger's system of terrorism, it is only necessary to quote the only independent investigator sent out by the English Press to Johannesburg—Mr. J. A. Hobson, who represented the *Manchester Guardian*. We shall explain in another article how the rest of the English Press was content to take its news from the offices of South African papers owned by the Rhodeses, the Beits, and the Ecksteins. Mr. Hobson says of Johannesburg :—

Everyone who has lived in that golden city is perfectly aware that liberty not to say licence, of speech and action has prevailed to an extent unknown in any other city of the civilised world. This talk about "helotry" and "the intolerable burdens of the Uitlanders" deceived no one in Johannesburg ; it was simply part of the jargon by which a clique of politicians handling the Press operated upon the British Government and public opinion for their own purposes. . . . Scores of people whom I have closely questioned inform me that they lived many years in Johannesburg, moving about freely at all hours, and have never got into any trouble or been molested by the police ; the condition of the streets even at a time of public excitement like the present is far more orderly than that of large districts of London.

But there were other kindred grievances. It is said that in Johannesburg there was neither right of public meeting nor freedom for the Press. There was also the "education" grievance. Let us glance at these in detail :—

1. This complaint is founded on the fact that on one occasion a mass meeting of "reformers" was broken up. Some weeks later something of the kind occurred in Trafalgar-square. But both of these, let us hope, were isolated cases. A successful meeting of protest against Boer rule was held unmolested in Johannesburg on 12 June. The Jingo Press, when it suited its argument, used to appeal to the support of "mass meetings held everywhere up and down the Rand."

2. The Press, so far from being let and hindered, indulged in daily provocations, in daily invective against Mr. Kruger and the Boers. How coarse and violent its language was only a series of quotations for which we have not space would adequately show. Ultimately Mr. Pakeman, of the *Leader*, was arrested. He had openly preached treason. In the *Leader* of 29 August appears the following :

The abolition of the Republic is not the end that we anticipated and hoped for ; yet we fully recognise the necessity for the step in view of the hopeless attitude of this Government.

Would we have tolerated such talk in Ireland in the days of the Coercion Act ?

3. The grievance regarding education was that in the *State-aided* schools of this Dutch Republic, Dutch was the language of instruction. It seems a natural state of affairs. English voluntary schools existed for Uitlander children, and these might have earned a grant if those gentlemen who were agitating for the privilege of burghership had been willing that their children should learn Dutch thoroughly. But we must remember that a very large proportion of the British subjects on the Rand were of foreign extraction. For these it must have been a serious privation that their children, debarred as they were,

through no fault of Mr. Kruger's, from learning English at their mother's knees, **were not taught it gratis in his schools.**

We have left to the last a set of grievances which were genuine. There can be no doubt that the Administration of the Transvaal was of the old-fashioned Tory type, and to some extent corrupt, though (as Mr. Leonard Phillips has shown) not so corrupt as some of the "reformers" wished. (*Appendix to Report on the Raid*, p. 591.) They succeeded so far as to make the petty venality of the Boers a nuisance; their votes, however, were never for sale. A nuisance Pretoria no doubt was, as Tammany Hall and Yildiz Kiosk and the Tsung-li-Yamen are nuisances. But who would dare to say that all this justified war? The taxes were rather wrong in their incidence than excessive in their amount. The Government had a right to raise a revenue from the gold extracted from its soil. It chose to do it by monopolies and indirect taxation. Its fiscal policy, like that of the Cape, was stringently Protectionist. As a result everything was dear, from dynamite and railway rates down to soda-water. This, if the Uitlanders were only honest, was the grievance that really brought about war. Real grievances though these were, note that they fell rather on a few capitalists than on the mass of the Uitlander population. If prices were dear, wages were high, and thus the burden really lay on the mine-owners on the Rand and the shareholders at home. Professional men were not grievously taxed. Thus Mr. Leonard, in his evidence before the Select Committee in 1897, admitted that from an income of £10,000 he paid only £150 in taxes, even including those which are indirect. Working-men were practically exempt. (See "Report of Select Committee on Raid," p. xlvi. § 15.) The fact is, as we hope to show in another article, that the war has been waged to-day with no other object than to raise the dividends of a few gold mines. There would have been no Stormberg disaster, no Magersfontein massacre, no Tugela repulse, if, instead of talking of outrages and atrocities, the Uitlander magnates and the Press they owned had honestly said that what they really wanted was cheaper dynamite and a lower wages bill.

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THE HAWKSLEY DOSSIER.

A "NEW FACT."

On 5 Jan. the *Indépendance Belge*, one of the oldest and most respected of Continental papers, published a series of secret documents that throw a startling light on the formation of the Select Committee which "investigated" the Jameson Raid, and on the attitude of the Colonial Office towards the Chartered Company. These papers were reproduced by the entire Continental Press. They were suppressed by all the Government organs in London, including the *Daily News*. Their genuineness has not yet been called in question, nor have their nominal authors repudiated their signatures. This silence is so unanimous that we can only treat it as a concerted attempt to suppress awkward but authentic evidence against Mr. Chamberlain and his friends. In response to numerous inquiries we have decided to reprint this suppressed Dossier.

**

I.—THE CHARTER GUARANTEED.

The "Dossier" does not of course establish the complicity of Mr. Chamberlain in the Raid. It does not even prove that he was privy to the plot which ended in the Raid. But it does show that the Colonial Office did all in its power to shield the Chartered Company from inquiry, and to protect it against punishment. Here, for example, is an assurance that its charter is not in danger. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State, it is interesting to remember, had both requested the Imperial Government after the Raid to assume the direct administration of Rhodesia.

Colonial Office, 6 May, 1896.

Dear Hawksley,—I can't find Meade's draft of the private assurance about the Charter, but there is Lord Selborne's version of it, and it seems to me the same thing.

"I. Assurance—strictly private—nothing intended versus Charter, pending an inquiry (if any) after judicial proceedings."

You are aware that Mr. Chamberlain intends to enlarge in his speech on the advantage of development by Company to development by the Government in countries like Matabeleland.

You are aware that Mr. Chamberlain wishes the announcement of acceptance to be made by the Company—and before Friday's debate. Labby evidently does not intend to press his questions to-morrow. I don't know about John Ellis, but he will probably also not press.—Yours truly,

(Signed) E. FAIRFIELD.

Mr. Fairfield, we should explain, was the permanent official who had charge of the South African department of the Colonial Office. Sir R. Meade was a colleague of his, and Lord Selborne was the Under-Secretary. Mr. Hawksley was the solicitor of the Chartered Company. Here, then, we have an authoritative assurance that Mr. Chamberlain did not wish to allay the suspicions and fears of the Boers by taking away the charter of Mr. Rhodes's company. His "strictly private assurance" directly contradicts his public threats. On 31 Dec., 1895, Mr. Fairfield wrote as follows in Mr. Chamberlain's name to the Chartered Company.

Mr. Chamberlain desires you to note that the South African Republic is a foreign State with which her Majesty is at peace and in treaty relations, and in connection I am to remind you—

1. Of the obligations imposed by the 22nd Article of the charter of the British South Africa Company to perform and undertake all the treaty obligations of her Majesty toward any other State or Power.

2. Of the power reserved by Article 8 to a Secretary of State to make known . . . his dissent, &c.

3. Of the further power reserved by Article 35 to the Queen to revoke and annul the privileges, powers, and rights of the Company under the Charter. Duplicity such as this needs no comment and admits of no defence.

** II.—PACKING THE COMMITTEE.

The following documents speak for themselves.

30, Mincing-lane, E.C.,

London, 22 July, 1896.

My dear Fairfield,—Is the rumor true that I hear to the effect that the Government have decided upon the appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons to inquire into the circumstances of Dr. Jameson's action in December last? If so, I suppose it will be possible for the views of the directors to be to some extent considered in appointing some of the members? In this case may I suggest the names of Mr. Carson, Q.C., Mr. A. C. Cripps, Q.C., and Mr. George Wyndham?

Will it be possible to have an opportunity of discussing with you the terms of the reference to the Select Committee?—Believe me, very truly yours,

BOURCHIER F. HAWKSLEY.

E. Fairfield, Esq.

Telegram.

27 July, 1896.

To Beit, Prince's-chambers, Pall-mall.

Just come in and find your telegram. Have seen Bourke, Wyndham, and Fairfield. Doing all possible to secure Wyndham as well as Chartered nominee. Regret impossible to call before dinner, but shall be at Burlington between eleven and twelve.—HAWKSLEY.

Telegram.

1 Aug., 1896.

To Fairfield, 7, Park-place, St. James's.

Best thanks for note and all your trouble. Let me know any difficulties or change as to constitution of committee. Could call this afternoon if desired.—HAWKSLEY.

In plain words, the Colonial Office earned the "best thanks" of the agent of Messrs. Beit and Rhodes (1) by keeping them posted up regarding every move against the Raid conspirators; (2) by enabling them to nominate their own judges; (3) by consulting their wishes as to subjects which the Select Committee should investigate. Mr. Cripps and Mr. Wyndham actually sat on the Committee. We are not sure that they were the only Chartered nominees.

**

III.—SIDELIGHTS ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE.

The documents enable us to trace to a certain extent the behavior of these gentlemen after "nomination":

Telegram.

Handed in at the West Dist. Office at 9.21 p.m., received here 9.36 p.m.: To Hawksley, Cliftonville Hotel, Margate.

Had an hour with Johnny. He will be all right. Wyndham promises not to leave it till he succeeds. I shall be back Tuesday morning.—JAMESON.

It would be interesting to know what "promise" Mr. Wyndham gave to Dr. Jameson, whose conduct he was appointed to investigate.

Here is a further glimpse:

Goldsmith-building, Temple, 7 Aug., 1897.

Dear Mr. Hawksley,—Can Mr. Charles Leonard come down to the House of Commons to-morrow at five o'clock? The committee meet (privately) at 4.30 in Col. Legge's room, and I could see Mr. Leonard immediately after the meeting breaks up.—Yours truly,

(Signed) JOHN C. BIGHAM.

Bourchier Hawksley, Esq.

Mr. Bigham is now a distinguished judge. We do not suppose that in ordinary civil or criminal cases he is in the habit of arranging interviews with witnesses and other parties to the case immediately after the sitting of court. It was falsely charged against one of the French judges who tried the Dreyfus Appeal that he had had five minutes' private talk with Colonel Picquart. That charge was sufficient to secure the removal of the case to another tribunal. Here is another record of a similar proceeding:

30, Mincing-lane, E.C.

London, 2 April, 1897.

Dear Sir,—I send you a memo about Sir John Willoughby.

Will you put the points in this memo to him, and also the two first paragraphs in the enclosed print. With regard to the official report it does not seem necessary that this should be read through, but Sir John will mark certain paragraphs and read them.

I am giving Mr. Nicholson further prints for circulation among the committee.—Believe me, yours faithfully,

BCURCHIER F. HAWKSLEY.

The Right Hon. W. L. Jackson, M.P.

Again we are reminded of the Dreyfus case. What right had Mr. Hawksley to send to Mr. Jackson, the Chairman of the Committee, a memorandum about Sir John Willoughby? And what is the meaning of "Prints for circulation among the Committee"? Are we to understand that documents were submitted to it, portions of which did not appear in evidence?

* *

IV.—THE SECRET CABLEGRAMS.

This Select Committee, composed in part of his colleagues in the Government and in part of the Chartered nominees, exonerated Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonial Office of all share in the Raid. To this verdict Mr. Chamberlain has always appealed. But a "new fact" may modify the chose jugée—in France if not in England. The question arises, then, how far this Hawksley Dossier constitutes a "new fact." It was known that Mr. Hawksley stubbornly withheld from the Committee certain cablegrams that passed between Cape Town and London while the Raid was being planned. It was generally suspected that these cablegrams if published would implicate Mr. Chamberlain, but of this we had no other evidence than his refusal to produce the copies of them in his possession. But we now know, on the authority of a letter from Mr. Hawksley to Earl Grey, that Mr. Chamberlain had something to conceal which was bound up with the suppression of these cablegrams:

Letter Book No. 230, page 688.

30, Mincing-lane, E.C.

London, 20 Feb., 1897.

My dear Grey,—Thanks for your letter of the 9th ult., which I read with great interest. You will, of course, have heard that the committee was reappointed, and has got to work. I send you official prints of the evidence already taken. Rhodes has done very well, and I think will come out top. He was nervous on the first day, though his evidence was good even then. Yesterday he was simply splendid. I do not think that we are by any means out of the wood, but there does seem an off-chance of the plea of

public interest being recognised and the cables of the last half of 1895, or rather the negotiations of that period, not being disclosed, though I am bound to say that I think on balance the probability is that they will have to come out. If they do, Mr. Chamberlain will have no one but himself to thank. I am very sorry I have been such a bad correspondent, but really the work and anxiety of the last 15 months or nearly two years—that is, since Harris came to England on the subject of the Protectorate in July, 1895—have been most trying, and I sometimes fear that even my constitution will not stand it much longer, though happily I am still very well. I will try and write to you more fully next week.—Believe me, very truly yours,

BOURCHIER F. HAWKSLEY.

P.S.—Rhodes has received your letter and cable about Lawley.
The Right Hon. Earl Grey.

Mr. Hawksley's fears were not realised. The cables and the "negotiations" of the latter half of 1895 were only very partially disclosed. But what inference follows from his fears? Clearly, that Mr. Chamberlain no less than the Chartered Company had something to lose by the revelation which never came. Another letter from Mr. Hawksley gives a useful inventory of these suppressed cablegrams, from Messrs. Beit, Harris, Rochford Maguire, and Earl Grey, in London, to Mr. Rhodes, at the Cape. It is dated 19 Feb., 1897. From that day to this they have lain in the archives of the Chartered Company. Would they have lain there so long if Mr. Chamberlain had refused to whitewash Mr. Rhodes? Might they not have found their way to Fleet-street, if, for example, he had required the Chartered Company to pay the promised indemnity for the Raid? And, finally, would this war have been "inevitable" if the clique which made it had held no Colonial Office skeleton locked within their cupboards?

**

A POSTSCRIPT.

On 1 February Mr. Chamberlain admitted, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, that the correspondence between Mr. Hawksley and Mr. Fairfield was genuine, and that the published version of it was "substantially but, he *thought*, not verbally correct." The other documents, he said, had been stolen; presumably, then, they also are authentic. The letters from Mr. Fairfield, he admitted, had been "sent under his instructions."

Mr. Balfour, when asked what action he would take "when a member of the Cabinet was deliberately charged with personal dishonor and public falsehood," replied that "such accusations should be treated with contempt."

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THE OTHER SIDE.

"The Loyal Englishman looks at the question from a British, and not from a Boer standpoint." —*Daily Mail*, 10 August, 1899.

"Hear the other side." —*Old Proverb*.

From the Boer standpoint the hundred years that began with our capture of Cape Town and ended with the present war have been a century of wrong. That is a hasty, if a natural view. We have been just at intervals, and spasmodically wise. Deliberately unrighteous, perhaps, we have never been; but we have treated South Africa and the destiny of the Boers as the playing of our passion for Empire and expansion. We went there, indeed, with no wish to conquer, no desire to colonise. We took the Cape solely to gain a safe half-way house on the road to India. We made of the Dutch and their country a means to our end. Having finally acquired the colony by purchase in 1814, we busily alienated its inhabitants. We governed through a bureaucracy, we allowed to the Dutch no representative institutions; we refused to recognise their language, though only a sixth of the population could speak English, and through blundering and parsimony we failed again and again to repel native invasions until the Kaffirs had laid waste the lands of our Dutch subjects. Then came the abolition movement at home. Like our own West Indian planters, the retrograde and isolated Dutch of South Africa were far from sharing our enthusiasm for the liberation of their slaves. This alone would not have alienated them, but we bungled the payment of their compensation claims, and offended their pride by dragooning them with Hottentot policemen. Despairing of our rule in 1836 their more stubborn spirits shook off our yoke and "trekked" to the unoccupied north—not to establish slavery there, but to maintain their own independence—"resolved," as their leader Retief put it, "to uphold the just principles of liberty," while taking "care that no one is brought by us into a condition of slavery." To the north and the east they found a derelict country which the Zulu had harried and left desolate. Again they reclaimed the wilderness, and fought unaided against Zulu and Matabele marauders. If ever the plough and the rifle can give to a people a valid title to the land they have made their own that title was won by these Dutch pioneers. Yet we followed them across our frontiers and drove them from Natal on the pretext that we could not afford for imperial and commercial reasons to leave them in possession of the coast. Later came a series of confused campaigns, in which we asserted our control over the Orange River sovereignty. But the middle years of the century were marked at home by the dominion of the Manchester school. We were busied with Commerce and Reform, and cared little for our remoter Empire. In 1852—in the Sand River Convention—we recognised the independence of the Transvaal. In 1854 we absolutely withdrew from the Free State, and in the same year we conciliated the Dutch who had remained in the colony by the grant of representative government. But these things were not for ever. That "treaties are mortal," is a saying of Lord Salisbury's. It condenses the wisdom of his predecessors.

**

It was not until the seventies that we began to trench upon the rights of the two Republics. In 1869 diamonds had been discovered at Kimberley, on the borders of the Free State. The land had several claimants—a native chief, the half-breed Waterboer, and the Free State itself. We backed the claim of

Waterboer, bought his rights from him in advance, and then submitted the dispute to the Governor of Natal as arbitrator. The Free State case was never heard, Waterboer was declared owner, and in 1871 we hoisted our flag over the disputed territory. Subsequently a British Court decided, on an appeal from the Free State, that Waterboer had no shadow of claim to the diamond fields. We did not on that account relax our hold on Kimberley. We took our stand on the general ground that a strong Power must police the mines, and in 1876 paid as conscience money to the Republic the grotesquely paltry sum of £90,000. Our motives may have been excellent, but to the Boer the whole transaction can only have appeared as a gigantic national robbery. But these were days of expansion. The crowds in the streets at home knew no god but Jingo, and Disraeli was his prophet. Once again the Dutch were sacrificed to the Imperial ambitions of British statesmen. The splendid adventurer who ruled us—the man who later proclaimed Queen Victoria "Empress of India," and all but plunged us into a second Russian war—annexed the Transvaal in 1877, tore up the Sand River Convention, and sent to Pretoria one of the most incapable administrators who have ever misrepresented the Crown. In two years we had sinned irretrievably against both the Dutch Republics.

The motive for Disraeli's annexation of the Transvaal was a passion to hurry on the federation of South Africa, the pretexts for it were the difficulties in which the Burghers were involved through internal dissensions and native wars. At first the Dutch acquiesced, but when a species of protectorate became in 1879 a Crown Colony, their old spirit reasserted itself, and under Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius they made haste to proclaim their independence. The news came at the turning point of the great conflict with the Jingoes over the Eastern Question. But absorbed as he was in the fate of the Eastern Christians, Mr. Gladstone yet found time to proclaim his sympathy with the aspirations of the Boers. Unfortunately he moved too late, owing largely to the Afghan war. He had resolved to restore to the Transvaal its independence, and negotiations to that end were already in progress when the ill-timed advance of General Colley on Majuba resulted in the memorable disaster of February, 1881, Mr. Gladstone's merit was that he had the moral courage to treat the affair as an accident which he would not allow to disturb his already settled purpose. In his view it was an incident which in no way affected the merits of the case. It is possible that the more ignorant among the Boers imagined that we were merely afraid to continue the war. It is certain that the "surrender" offended our own colonists. But the great mass of the Boers, we imagine, appreciated our generosity and self-restraint. In the National hymn of the Transvaal the popular gratitude is very clearly expressed :—

Know'st thou that land, in years a child
'Mid realms of high degree,
On which the might of Britain smiled
When rang those words "Be Free."

That verse would not be sung on every public occasion in Pretoria, if Mr. Gladstone's "magnanimity" had inspired contempt.

It is not to Majuba Hill but to the Jameson Raid that we must look for the historic source of all our later troubles. The decade that followed the Convention of Pretoria was chiefly marked by our success in hemming in the Transvaal to the West and the North. If ever Mr. Kruger dreamed of expansion, his ambitions were frustrated by the wealth and energy of Mr. Rhodes. With the amalgamation of the Diamond Mines at Kimberley into the De Beers Company, and the discovery of gold in the Transvaal, the destinies of South Africa were changed. Its politics passed into the hand of a little group of

financiers mainly aliens. The founding of Johannesburg in 1887, and the incursion, two years later, of a vast industrial horde into the territories of the pastoral Boer republic created a wholly new situation. The new comers complained that the Pretoria Government was corrupt, while the Uitlanders are represented as "helots" laboring under oppression. The history of the Transvaal between 1894 and 1896 proves two things—that the Boers behaved marvellously like honest men, and that the Uitlanders, as a whole, acted like a population content with its lot. The Rhodesian clique attempted, by three methods to acquire power in the State:—

1. By bribery. A fund was started to "improve the Raad." It turned out to be above corruption.
2. By "constitutional agitation." This also failed because, as Mr. Lionel Phillips put it, the Uitlanders "did not care a fig for the franchise."
3. By the revolution and the Raid. This also failed because the Uitlanders would not march out to meet the Rhodesian mercenaries. Evidently no one would stir except those in the direct pay of the Chartered Company.

The significance of the Raid lies in the fact that it was not a Uitlander revolt against Boer oppression, but an attempt on the part of the Rhodesians to seize the Transvaal under the English flag. But there was something even worse than this. The Boers, like the rest of the civilised world outside these islands, and no inconsiderable faction within them, were firmly convinced that Mr. Chamberlain was privy to the Raid. The Colonial Secretary stood accused of complicity in an underhand plot against the independence of a State which we had thrice guaranteed by solemn treaties. But worst of all was the attitude of England in the matter. The *Times* and the Poet Laureate, the London crowd and the music halls with one voice hailed the incompetent Rhodesian freebooters as heroes worthy of the Empire. A Select Committee of Parliament exonerated Mr. Chamberlain, who immediately proceeded to whitewash the admittedly guilty Rhodes. The arch-conspirator remained a member of the Privy Council, and through De Beers, the Chartered Company, and the Consolidated Gold-fields, exercised all his old power. Only a few young officers were rather leniently punished. Of indemnity and compensation not a penny has been paid. England then was impenitent; her official repudiation of the Raid went for nothing. The Boers felt that Dr. Jameson would have won only applause had he succeeded. They could not but conclude that sooner or later another attempt would be made upon their independence. They did what any prudent people would have done in their place—they armed in anticipation of another and more formidable attack.

* * *

We did nothing after the Raid to allay the suspicion, the dread, the bewilderment which it caused. We did everything in our power to confirm in Mr. Kruger's mind the belief that we meant to compass his undoing by any means and every pretext. Mr. Chamberlain's revival in 1897 of the claim to Suzerainty, which we abandoned in 1884, was a sort of diplomatic Raid, not less iniquitous and hardly less offensive than the fiasco of Krugersdorp. (See Leaflet No. 3, page 2.) In one form or another this assertion of Suzerainty, paramountcy, or supremacy, has been the key to all our mistakes. The snatching of Kimberley, the annexation of the Transvaal, the Jameson Raid, and Mr. Chamberlain's claim of Suzerainty were one and all the expression of our determination to do what we please with territory not our own. As the *Times* put it on 24 May last:—

"*Apart from our treaty rights it is our duty to South Africa, as the Paramount Power, to see that our great interests, political and material, in that region are not kept in lasting jeopardy by the unintelligent perversity of the least enlightened white community within its borders.*"

Such were the conditions under which the late crisis opened—on the Boer side an intolerable sense of historic wrong and a suspicion of coming evil that would not be silenced, on the British a masterful and domineering temper that made light of treaties and trusted to a policy of menace and coercion. The grievances of which we complained were trivial so far as they were real. They were exaggerated of set purpose by a press in the pay of the Rand financiers. But despite the weakness of our case and the provocative tone of our diplomacy, a point was reached at last where the Boers were ready to yield slightly more than we had asked. It is Mr. Chamberlain's failure to close with the offer of August (see Leaflet No. 3) that brands this war as needless.

**

But is there no escape from a war which is needless, even if it were just? Either our object is to redress the grievances of the Uitlanders, or it is to destroy the independence of the two Republics. For the moment our duty is to repel the invasion of our colonies—provoked though it was by our own obviously aggressive policy. But once the frontier is crossed the Republics can hope for nothing but to sell their independence dearly. Anything short of this they would almost certainly grant. Let us exact reforms, let us even require disarmament, offering on our side to conclude a general treaty of arbitration as a security for the future. For the Rand we might ask autonomy as Mr. Chamberlain himself suggested in 1896. But if we demand more than this—an absolute surrender to be followed by annexation—the mere prolonging of the war at the cost of blood and money will be the least of the evils we shall incur. We shall be forced to govern our new territories from Downing-street and hold them with an enormous garrison. At home we shall be face to face with conscription and abroad with dishonor, while the sole gain of the war will be that we shall have handed over the destinies of South Africa to a clique of alien millionaires, who will exploit the natives and exasperate the Dutch until their mines are exhausted and their treasure spent. A lasting peace, a final settlement we shall not win by arms alone. The Dutch will remain masters of the soil; already they outnumber us, already they distrust us. The more numerous generation that will grow up to plough the battlefields of this campaign will not learn loyalty from widowed mothers. We can break with the past and inaugurate a happier future only by exchanging a policy of force for a programme based on sympathy, respect, conciliation.

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1. When and Why the Boers Armed. 2. The Case of the Natives. 3. Pushful Diplomacy. 4. The Uitlander Grievances.	5. The Real Motive for the War. 9. Mr. Chamberlain and the Raid. 7. The Hawksley Dossier. 8. The Other Side.
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